It has been suggested that convertible debt can be used to reduce the tendency towards excessive risk-taking in a firm that includes debt in its capital structure. We show that the ability of convertible debt to perform this function is greatly reduced if stake holders can trade in derivative securities with payoffs contingent on the cashflows of the firm. We show, further, that bankruptcy courts can ensure the same result precisely by deviating from absolute priority. Our model explains two real-world phenomena; one, why bankruptcy law seems to be structured in such a way as to favor equity holders and facilitate deviations from absolute priority, and two, why small firms are more likely to use convertible debt.
law will choose the most efficient of the possible assignments of property rights, wherever unavoidable transactions costs preclude achievement of a fully efficient result by private negotiation.
In our model, we obtain the optimal risk sharing contract in an environment in which all investors have access to contingent claims markets. This contract is characterized by the bankruptcy court's imposition of an allocation of the firm's assets in bankruptcy states, in which equity holders receive a positive share. In non-bankruptcy states, the market solution prevails--that is, investors hold straight debt and equity. Under this contract, equity holders find they have no incentive to switch to riskier assets. The optimal contract derived in this paper then, is precisely what would result if bankruptcy courts were to deviate from absolute priority rules to award equity holders a share in the firm's assets.
We show that a system of legal procedures which favors equity holders in times of financial distress by providing them with a bargaining advantage, 11 ensures that risk sharing in bad states will occur and as a consequence mitigates the agency costs of debt.
Bankruptcy courts, in this way, are seen to represent a natural solution to the moral hazard problems associated with debt. 12 There is now substantial evidence that bankruptcy courts do not follow absolute priority rules. Franks and Torous, 13 Weiss 14 and Eberhart, Moore and Roenfeldt 15 document that many firms in bankruptcy violate absolute priority rules. Furthermore, in a large proportion of these cases, the violations favor equity holders. For example, Eberhart, Moore and Roenfeldt 16 document that, in their sample, the amount paid to share holders in excess of that which they would have received under the absolute priority rule averages 7.6% of the total award to all claimants. Our model shows that such seemingly 6 irresponsible behavior by the courts in fact could very well increase economic efficiency by reducing agency costs.
Our model could also explain why the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which favors equity holders in bankruptcy, came into existence when it did. On the one hand, the economy had been growing more uncertain in the post oil-shock era implying greater the opportunities for excessive risk-seeking behavior. On the other hand, there had recently evolved a vast array of derivative securities such as stock options, and financial futures: the CBOE opened its doors in 1973, although stock options were traded prior to that over the counter, and financial futures trading began in 1975. The existence of these contingent claims suggests that the costs of creating new derivative securities were a lot lower than they had previously been. Consequently, the ability of investors to undo firms' financial decisions had increased, providing a need for an extra-market resolution to the agency problems of debt. Stock market uncertainty and the use of financial derivative securities have only increased since that time, implying that the use of convertible debt and other theoretically incentive compatible contracts should have decreased over the last decade or two. In fact, Lehn and Poulsen 17 found that the ratio of convertible debt to straight debt declined during the eighties.
In the next section, we present our formal model. Since our purpose is to investigate the treatment of debt in bankruptcy, we begin with sufficient assumptions to generate the issuance of debt. We then introduce moral hazard which results in agency costs of debt. We show that if there are no contingent claims markets in which shareholders can trade, the manager can reduce these agency costs by issuing modified debt securities, which involve greater risk sharing. In section III, we show that this is not a sustainable market equilibrium if contingent claims markets exist, thereby opening up a 7 role for the judicial system to enforce the optimal amount of risk sharing. The final section concludes.
II. THE MODEL
Before laying out the former model, we present an intuitive explanation of our arguments. We first assume that investors have utility functions that require the issuance of debt for optimal risk-sharing. 18 We then show that this engenders an agency problem in the form of inappropriate incentives for risk-taking. However, if investors are denied access to contingent claim markets, this problem can be resolved by issuing convertible debt. This salutary effect of convertible debt is, of course, well known and does not require much explanation. However, our model now goes beyond the current models in analyzing the more realistic scenario where investors do have access to contingent claim markets.
While convertible debt may succeed in solving the agency problem, it does not provide individual investors with their most preferred payoff pattern. 19 In the absence of agency problems, the firm's share holders prefer to hold equity levered by straight debt, while bond holders prefer to hold straight debt. Now, if investors are permitted to trade in contingent claims, a debt holder will split the convertible debt issued by the firm into its straight debt and warrant components, sell off the warrant 20 and thereby achieve his most preferred payoff pattern. Moreover, since by issuing convertible debt the firm has committed itself to choosing the less risky asset (when the opportunity arises), this
investor can achieve what was previously not available to him--his first best consumption pattern; that is, his preferred consumption pattern in the absence of the agency problem.
A similar analysis would apply to the equity holder as well. Hence, when the firm issues 8 convertible debt, each investor has the incentive to free ride by obtaining the benefits of the resolution of the moral hazard problem without bearing the costs of the suboptimal risk sharing that the issue of convertible debt implies.
The result of each investor trading on his own account, of course, is that all share holders trade away from equity levered by the convertible debt contract and trade back to equity levered by straight debt. 21 Consequently, a manager who maximizes the wealth of the firm's equity holders will have the same incentive to substitute into riskier projects after convertible debt has been issued, as he had prior to the issuance of convertible debt.
Any attempt by the manager to reduce the agency problem by altering the securities issued by the firm is thus compromised when all parties have access to contingent claims markets.
Although market participants by themselves fail to resolve the agency problem, an external agent in the form of the bankruptcy court, can impose a contract that resolves the agency problem. We show that the optimal method by which the court can achieve this is precisely to deviate from absolute priority. We now proceed to the formal model.
A. The Standard Debt Contract
To understand the effect that court decisions have on the securities market, we have to consider that market in the absence of judicial intervention. Consider a three date world in which there are two types of agents, who differ in both endowments as well as preferences. 22 For the moment we consider only agents' endowments, leaving a description of their preferences for later. At time 0, each agent is endowed with a single type of security. Type A agents own all the shares in a firm which consists of a single asset whose random payoff, X, is realized at time 2. Type B agents are endowed with bonds exogenous to the firm, which provide a cash payment of $W with certainty at time 2. At time 0, agents are permitted to trade in the shares of the firm or in the exogenous bonds, as well as in any other securities that the manager of the firm may want to issue.
At time 1, the manager, acting in the best interests of the shareholders, may have the option to exchange the firm's asset for another asset whose (different) random payoff is also realized at time 2. We assume for now that agents cannot trade in contingent claims.
Since agents of each type are homogenous, we can assume without loss of generality, that there is only one agent of each type. We can also dispense with the manager temporarily--if he acts in agent A's interest and there is only one agent A, the manager is for all purposes identical with agent A. We will also assume, for the moment, that the option to switch assets is unavailable. In such an environment, the two agents will enter into contracts to take advantage of their abilities to share risk in such a way as to Pareto-improve on their original endowments. 23 These Pareto-optimal contracts will be composed of some payment P from agent B to agent A 24 in exchange for a portion, y(X), of the asset's payoff which solves the problem:
subject to agent B's Individual Rationality constraint,
where U i (.), i = A,B are the utility functions of A and B respectively, u B is agent B's reservation utility level and F(.) is the cumulative density of X over its domain (the positive reals). It is assumed that agents' utility functions have the usual derivative properties: U' > 0 and U" ≤ 0. The admissible class of functions y(X), among which the maximum is sought, consists of all functions such that 0 ≤ y(X) ≤ X, for all X.
The solution to the maximization problem in (1) is characterized below. The intuition is straightforward. Since the essence of the contract is risk-sharing, the optimal contract assigns shares in the asset so that the agent bearing the greatest risk is the one most willing to do so, that is, the less risk averse agent.
Proposition 1:
25 The optimal solution to the asset owner's problem (1) satisfies:
where R i , i = A,B, is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion.
At this point, we assume a convenient set of preferences for the agents which permits the generation of the standard debt contract given by min(X,D). To this end, we assume that the agents' preferences can be described by the following functions:
where Ψ i and Φ i , i = A,B, are concave and linear utility functions respectively. In good states of the world (X > D) the asset owner, agent A, is risk neutral and agent B is risk averse, while in bad states of the world (X ≤ D) the reverse is true. 26 We are now ready to characterize the optimal contract. Since agent A's utility function is concave over part of its domain, it follows that he will switch to the higher variance asset. Agent B, however, is aware of the incentive agent A has to switch to the riskier asset and so would accept the standard debt contract only at a lower price P 2 . 28 At this price agent A will continue to select asset 2. Since asset 1 has greater value, this is inefficient and in neither agent A's interest nor in agent B's; both of them would prefer to create appropriate incentives so that agent A will, in fact, choose asset 1. It is the conflict of interest engendered by the standard debt contract which makes agent A prefer asset 2 to asset 1. An obvious way to remove this conflict of interests is to ensure that agent B's utility is independent of agent A's choice of asset. If the sharing rule is chosen so that this guarantee is provided, there will be no conflict of interest, since agent A cannot dispossess agent B by his choice of asset. Consequently, he will choose the more valuable asset, asset 1. The required guarantee can be provided by imposing an additional incentive compatibility constraint on agent A's optimization problem:
where F 1 and F 2 are the cumulative distributions of the returns to assets 1 and 2 respectively.
In this environment, the opimal risk sharing contract, denoted ŷ , will solve the optimization problem in (1), modified by replacing F(.) by F 1 (.), and subject to the additional incentive compatibility constraint. If we substitute the incentive compatibility Constraint (7) into B's Individual Rationality Constraint (1b), agent A's problem can be written as: Max U X y X P dF X U W y X P dF X u
The resulting risk sharing contract is described by the following proposition.
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Proposition 4: The optimal solution to the asset owner's constrained problem is a contract which satisfies:
where R i is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, f i is the probability density function (p.d.f.) associated with F i for i = 1,2 and f i ' is the first derivative of the p.d.f. for each i = 1,2.
Contract > y provides agent A with the incentive to select the lower variance asset by providing agent A with a share in the selected asset's payoffs in bankruptcy states, as well as in non-bankruptcy states. This can be seen by noting that the first order condition for Contract > y (as given by equation (9)) differs from the corresponding condition for the standard debt contract by the term (f 1 '/f 1 -f 2 '/f 2 )(R A + R B ) -1 . Since the standard deviations of the returns on the two assets differ, their p.d.f.'s also differ over the entire range of the asset's payoffs, causing this term to be non-zero over the entire range of payoffs. Whereas the standard debt contract provides a constant payment to the risk averse agent in the appropriate states and thereby transfers risk completely (to agent A in the good states and to agent B in the bad states), Contract > y requires that neither agent receive a constant payment. This leads us to the following conclusion:
Proposition 5: If the agents' utility functions are given by equation (5), the optimal contract involves risk sharing between the two agents in all states. In this section, we allow agents to trade contingent claims; while type A agents still make their asset choices through the firm's manager, all agents may, in addition, trade in derivative securities with payoffs contingent on the firm's cash flows. We also explicitly allow for many type A and type B agents.
A. Market Failure
To see why market failure occurs with Contract > y , let us assume that the manager acts to maximize shareholder wealth and issues Contract > y in order to avoid the moral hazard problem. In a competitive environment where each agent takes the behavior of others as given, potential lenders may initially assume that the manager will remain with the lower variance project, asset 1--that is, that asset substitution will not occur.
However, once assured that asset 1 will be selected, both type A and B agents will find that they have an incentive to alter the payoff pattern that each receives from Contract > y .
That is, each will attempt to trade away from their contract obligations.
Consider a type B agent's behavior when the selection of the lower variance asset is taken as given. Under this condition, he would prefer the standard debt contract, which provides a non-random payment in the non-bankruptcy states (when he is risk averse) and an increasing payoff in the bankruptcy states (when he is risk neutral).
Similarly, a type A agent would prefer the payoff pattern he would receive from the equity side of a standard debt contract. The question is: can these two agents engage in trades which provide them with their desired payoff patterns? If they are permitted to trade in derivative securities, the answer is yes. Consider the set of payoffs which are equal to the difference between those received by a type B agent under Contract > y and those received under the standard debt contract. These residual payoffs are positive in some states and negative in others. All that the type B agent needs to do to achieve a pattern of payoffs similar to those of the standard debt contract is to sell contingent claims yielding the positive residual payoffs to the type A agent and to buy from him, claims yielding the negative ones. This has the exact effect of bringing the type A agent from Contract > y to the standard debt contract. Hence the type A agent would be willing to sell what the type B agent wants to buy and vice versa. Of course, all agents would behave in a similar fashion. Consequently, even if managers issued only securities of the Contract $ y type, all shareholders and lenders would end up holding, after trading on their own accounts, the payoff structures associated with the standard debt contract.
Now consider the behavior of a firm's manager under these conditions. The manager understands that when he issues Contract > y , the firm's owners will trade in 16 derivative securities so as to ultimately hold securities with the same payoff pattern as that of equity levered by straight debt. He would realize that there is, once again, an opportunity to transfer wealth from the debtholders to the equityholders. Hence, following the stricture to maximize owners' wealth, managers would in fact substitute the higher risk asset for the lower risk asset. Therefore, Contract > y is not a (Nash) equilibrium contract.
B. The Courts' Solution
The ability of agents to buy and sell derivative securities, and so "free ride" on the market, makes it impossible for firms' managers to eliminate the agency costs associated with the moral hazard problem. Even though Contract > y makes all agents better off, it cannot be sustained in the market. However, an outside institution could make the market participants better off through the imposition of another Pareto-improving contract akin to Contract > y . One such institution is the legal system. Of course, the courts can only impose their contract at those times when they have jurisdiction over the parties, that is, in bankruptcy states. Consequently, in non-bankruptcy states, the payoffs from the court-imposed contract would have to be the same as those supported by the market. Those payoffs, as we saw in the previous section, are the payoffs of the standard debt contract.
The problem the courts face, then, is to find an optimal contract which pays debtholders a constant amount equal to D in all non-bankruptcy states and which, in addition, eliminates the incentive for equity holders to engage in asset substitution. This problem is identical to the constrained owner's problem with the additional constraint that the contract provide a constant payment equal to D in the non-bankruptcy states. The court's problem can then be stated as: In bankruptcy states, the solution to this problem (Contract g) satisfies: In non-bankruptcy states, the court's contract provides that agent B receive a constant payment D, as required by (12) . We can now state:
Proposition 6: The optimal solution to the court's problem requires that equity holders share the risk of asset 1 in bankruptcy.
As shown in Figure 3 , the payoff to both debt holders and equity holders is increasing in the asset's payoff for X ≤ D. 30 Debt holders get exactly D whenever X > D, while equity holders get the residual. Again, it is the risk sharing in the bankruptcy states which ensures that the manager will choose the lower variance asset. Thus we see that the moral hazard problem is resolved when the courts impose their own contract awarding equity a portion of the value of the firm in bankrupt states.
______________
Put Figure 2 here _________________ The entire argument for the efficiency of deviations from absolute priority can now be summarized. Agents' preferences lead the firm to issue standard debt. However, because of managers' options to switch to riskier assets, agency problems arise.
Managers, knowing that any attempt to solve the agency problem through market mechanisms will only lead to offsetting actions by stock holders and bond holders, refrain from altering the form of the standard debt contract. All market participants realize, however, that if the firm does go into bankruptcy, the courts will deviate from absolute priority and award a positive share of the firm's assets to equity holders. Consequently the desired risk sharing occurs and perverse incentives for managers to switch to riskier assets are eliminated. The expected court award to stock holders will, of course, be taken into account when the market prices debt, but on the other hand, so will the elimination of agency costs.
C. Robustness Issues Regarding the Court's Solution
At this point, the objection may be raised that the solution imposed by the court is equally subject to being undone by equityholders and bondholders, and hence is not Nash either. However, on reflection, it can be seen that this is not true. The problem is not so much that contracts specifying a reassignment of payoffs under bankruptcy cannot be 19 written, but rather that they cannot be legally enforced. If the bankruptcy court is consciously deviating from absolute priority for social welfare reasons, it will clearly not enforce a contract that seeks to nullify the court's objectives. In practice, it would seem from the statements made by bankruptcy court judges, that they believe that they are not deviating from absolute priority. Consequently, it is not possible to get the court to enforce a contract that asks for the deviation from absolute priority to be reversed. Any enforcement of such an offsetting contract will require a valuation of cash flows different from the court's valuation and such an objective valuation clearly cannot be obtained from the court.
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A further objection that comes to the fore at this point regards the assumption that the issue of debt securities is induced by investors' preferences. Is this tantamount to assuming a special set of circumstances that generates the implications of the model regarding the impotence of capital structure to resolve agency problems? The answer, once again, is in the negative. As we have explained in footnote 21, the only assumption that is needed for our result is that investors prefer to hold some security other than strips; 32 and as explained above, this is really not a restriction on the result at all, since there would be no agency problems (of the type treated in this paper) at all if agents only wished to hold strips. In fact, we will argue that a condition for the existence of such agency problems is that the firm issue the non-strip security because investors have a preference for it (or that is, at least, one of the reasons). Formally, this can be stated as that is, V implies that W and Z cannot be simultaneously true. We now demonstrate this by considering two alternative at the corporate level reasons for the issuance by the firm of a non-strip security, say, straight debt: 1) corporate taxes and 2) signalling, and show that under these circumstances, no agency problem can exist.
Case 1: Assume that there are corporate taxes levied on the profits of the firm. Since debt service payments are tax-deductible, the manager will prefer to pay out some of the earnings of the firm as interest. Hence the firm will have some debt and some equity. Now, proposition V says that investors have no preferences for non-strip securities.
Hence, all investor portfolios will consist of strips of the firm and there will be no incentive problems associated with debt.
Case 2: Now, assume that there is asymmetric information between corporate insiders and outsiders and this leads the manager to issue debt, 33 which would otherwise not be issued.
Again, the investors in the firm have no desire to hold the debt and the levered equity separately and hence they will end up holding strips.
In both these cases, the corporate capital structure contains debt; however, the ultimate portfolio held by the investors (including any home-made securities) will, in effect, not contain debt and hence there is no moral hazard problem. Hence the only way for the agency problems to exist is if investors have a preference for non-strip securities, such as debt. Since the investors themselves have no desire to hold non-strip securities, firm-level considerations will not affect their portfolio decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper provides a resolution to the problem of why bankruptcy courts award equity holders a share in the value of the firm even when that value is less than the sum of the contractual payments promised to debt holders. We show that an essential aspect of such deviation from absolute priority rules is that equity holders share in the value of the firm even in bad states. This value-sharing is anticipated even before bankruptcy and affects the manager's actions throughout the life of the firm. Consequently, the negative incentive effects of debt, as regards engagement in risk-seeking activity, are mitigated.
We show, furthermore, that the effectiveness of convertible debt to resolve this agency problem is greatly reduced if investors can trade in derivative securities with payoffs contingent on the cashflows of the firm. Under these circumstances, investors can undo the convertibility feature through trading on their own account; hence a manager desiring to maximize shareholder wealth will, once again, have an incentive to engage in excessive risk-taking. Finally, using the definition of the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, and substituting for λ in terms of the marginal utilities from equation (3), we obtain equation (2) [ ]
G t G t dt
, and furthermore, for finite a ≥ 0,
Now, let G 1 (t) = 1 -G 1 (t) and G 2 (t) = 1 -G 2 (t). Then it follows from equation (2) that (9) where R i is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, f i is the probability density function (p.d.f.) associated with F i for i = 1,2 and f i ' is the first derivative of the p.d.f. for each i = 1,2.
Proof: As in the proof of Proposition 1, the optimal solution to this problem can be solved by pointwise maximization of the function g(y) = U A f 2 + λ(U B (y) -u B )f 1 . Now, in a manner analogous to that of the previous proof, we can obtain equation (9) . Q.E.D. Economics, 115 (1984) . 4 Our argument applies more generally to all attempts to eliminate agency costs through capital structure. However, we restrict our discussion to convertible securities and the like, because the cost of undoing such capital structure effects seem to be much smaller than the cost of, say, creating homemade leverage. 25 All proofs can be found in the appendix. 26 Such a scenario might obtain, for example, if agent A had high exogenously endowed wealth in good states and agent B had high exogenously endowed wealth in bad states. Assuming that both agents have decreasing absolute risk aversion, their utility functions would be similar to those defined above. 29 Strictly speaking, equation (9) allows the payoff to the debt holder to be decreasing over some range in the return to the asset. If, for exogenous considerations, this is deemed undesirable, an alternative contract can be constructed, which has the same incentive properties as ŷ , but is non-decreasing in X. It can be shown that such a contract will also satisfy Proposition 4. For expositional purposes, we have chosen to depict such an alternative version of ŷ in Figure 2 . 30 As X approaches D from below, the payoff to the equity holder under contract g drops from a positive amount to zero. This may create an additional moral hazard problem, in that the manager now has an incentive to hasten bankruptcy. To avoid this, if it is desired that the payoff to the equity holder should be everywhere non-decreasing in X, such a contract can be easily created, without losing the desirable incentive properties guaranteed by Proposition 6.
31 For example, one of the ways in which deviations from absolute priority occur is when the court overvalues securities awarded to debtholders in a reorganization by using an overly low discount rate; because the equityholder in a reorganization remains in possession, he receives equity with positive value, violating absolute priority (see Brown (1989) . Now in order to offset the deviations from absolute priority, we need to have trades in state contingent securities which require the equityholder to payback to the debtholder the difference between the 'true' value of the securities awarded to the debtholder in the reorganization and the value assigned to them by the court. But there is no objective way to determine the 'true' value of these securities. As far as the court is concerned the value it has assigned them is the true value. Hence the equity holder will not be able to enforce these offsetting contracts.
32 This demand for non-strip securities may be generated by a variety of causes;
for example, personal taxes, risk attitudes or non-tradeable endowments. In all cases, other than where the demand is generated by risk attitudes, the utility functions referred to in section II may be considered as being derived utilities conditional on endowments, taxes and so on. 
